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  Félix Peña

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  FUNAG and University of Bologna | Río de Janeiro, Octobre 22nd.
Future global and regional governance: a view from the Deep South


Paper prepared for the Seminar "Global Governance: Crossed Perceptions" organized by FUNAG and University of Bologna

Río de Janeiro, October 22nd 2013.

1. Some main challenges for global governance in a G-0 world.

With regard to the issue of global governance at least three approaches are possible. Firstly, global governance is related with the classic tension between order and anarchy, which in its most extreme version refers to the alternation between peace and war in the relations among nations (Aron1962). This is a tension that has had in the long history epicenters mainly of a regional scope. In those epicenters the connectivity and, the physical proximity between sovereign political units have intensified the tension originated from the perception of opposed values and interests, which many times have led to conflict and eventually armed confrontation among neighbors. Since the World War II, especially due to the collapse of physical distances resulting from technological changes in communications and transport, chain reactions caused by regional conflicts have often enlarged their geographical scope. So in this first approach, global governance is related with the existence of institutions and rules that, due to their effectiveness and legitimacy, ensure the prevalence of an international order that neutralizes the tendencies towards the use of force among nations at the regional or interregional level.

Various other approaches to global governance are indeed possible. One of them refers to unequal effects resulting from the organization of production in transnational value chains. On the one hand, the global transnational productive networks contribute to accelerate the transmission of the impact of economic and financial crisis between nations, even distant ones, such as has been evident after the recent 2008 crisis. It has visible effects still present in many countries, calling yet for certain reserve in the diagnosis of its defeat. But on the other hand, precisely due to the connectivity and chain effects that they generate between the different economic systems at a trans-national scale, the proliferation of such productive networks increases the interest of nations in avoiding a worsening of the crisis through the policies applied to defend themselves. This is almost the opposite of what happened during the Great Depression of 30's. The ease of contagion generates a collective interest in answers that preserve global order and governance in the face of any trend towards a "run for your life" attitude. At the same time it promotes favorable reflexes toward the idea of an effective international economic order and of global governance.

A third approach -the one that we are going to focus on-, is related with the capacity of the international system to articulate solutions for relevant issues of the global economic agenda that, due to their scope, can only be tackled effectively by some agreement among all nations. This means that it is not possible for them to be tackled successfully only by one nation or a limited group of nations. Those issues are the result of the globalization of the economic activities. Among others, we can mention those related with climate-change, the trade and currency "wars", the global regulation of the financial markets and the creation of conditions favorable for the development of all nations. It is precisely in view of this reality of globalization of the world economy that systemic deficiencies may be observed.

In fact, the shifts in world power during the last decades (Zakaria 2008), have gradually eroded the ability of the international institutions related as a result of WW II to generate effective responses to the most relevant economic issues of the global agenda. It is not an easy task now to adapt them to the new geography of world power. And those then originated in the financial domain as informal mechanisms between the most developed nations such as the G7, have shown their inadequacies when the 2008 crisis and its economic implications became evident. They led to resort to the G20 which, however, has been unable to pass the test of sustainable efficiency and international legitimacy. Thus, at the global level, it has become difficult to gather around a single negotiating table the sufficient critical mass of power that is required for decisions to effectively impact reality. In the presence of relevant issues of the global agenda that demands effective and legitimate decisions, the fundamental question remains which nations should be summoned and which nations understand that they should be summoned? Not always the answer will be the same to both questions. Traditionally it has been force more than reason what has set the rules for sustainable order in the relations between autonomous units of power at the international level. At least these are the teachings of the long history of mankind. This is the reason why what is currently happening in international relations -the idea of achieving order without war- is such a novelty, both at the global level and in some of the regional spaces that have had a greater tradition of violent conflicts and wars.

The scattering of world power in multiple relevant centers is complicating the task of redesigning the institutions of a new global architecture. The existing ones were born at a time when it was clear who held most power, which was enough to be acknowledged as the maker of rules at world level. As many times before, the answer emerged from war. This accounts for agreements such as Breton Woods. It also explains why it can be an illusion to pretend to reproduce a similar scenario now, a kind of "another Breton Woods" demanded by some economists. The failed attempts, between l918 and 1939, to create international institutions that made the world governable, remind us how difficult it is to achieve viable agreements in a multi-polar and heterogeneous context without a previous enforced definition of which countries can effectively guarantee international order.

The problem is then at the level of power relations between nations. For a time at least it will not be an easy task to add up the necessary concentration of power in order to adapt the institutions that make global economic governance possible. Not only has the international system become globalize but it tends to be a kind of "multiplex world" (Acharya 2013). Several other factors also help turn it heterogeneous in terms of values, memories, perceptions and visions. This means that it is potentially more ungovernable. From there the growing importance of mechanisms that enable to summon a sufficient critical mass of power to make possible a process of creation of new international rules, the revision of the existing international institutions (such as the UN and world financial institutions) or to insure their proper functioning (such as the WTO). It could be facilitated by the agreements that may be achieved in those formal or informal ambits of regional scope, such as the EU, or trans-regional such as BRICS. In certain way they all represent diverse modalities of coalitions of nations that, at the same time, reflect different international subsystems. These are coalitions of a variable geometry adapted to the main issues of the regional, trans-regional or global agenda that lead to its formation. They can even be coalitions with superposed memberships. A country may be member of different coalitions at the same time, depending on its relative relevance in different international subsystems. The joint work of the coalitions of nations towards common goals has been frequent in the history of international relations. Often they are of informal groups without institutionalization. Other times they result in formal agreements that originate international agencies. Additionally, other of their objectives reflects the interests of a group of nations in international trade negotiations, for example within the framework of the WTO or to have an impact in the definition of new international institutions, or the transformation of the existing ones. The latter could be precisely the case of BRICS.

In historical terms, what is currently happening poses so an unprecedented challenge. It consists of an attempt, through dialogue and negotiations between nations with varying degrees of power and a diversity of interests, to find an agreement on the mechanisms, rules and conditions that will enable to achieve reasonable levels of regional and global governance. It implies favoring the method of a gradual transformation or metamorphosis (Morin 2010) that comes as a result of the main changes that are taking place at the multiple levels of the political, economical, social and cultural life of nations. It is an unprecedented challenge precisely because the experience of the last centuries has shown that the shifts in world power, such as the ones that can be seen today at a global scale, have encouraged a tendency towards anarchy and not necessarily towards a sustainable order. Therefore, the violent confrontations and innovative modalities of wars, which have sometimes lasted some years, have determined in the past the transition towards new periods of world order in which those with superiority of power prevailed (Goldstein 1988).

Today each nation appears to be on its own (Bremmer 2012). This is a blunt way of describing the criteria that seems to prevail in the new international economic reality especially in the transition from a collapsing world order to one that may still take a long time to emerge and to consolidate. Quite soundly Bremmer points out right from the title of his last book this characteristic of a world in which each nation must find its own way of navigating it so as not to become a loser. Because, as also hinted by the title of the book, there is no doubt that there will be winners and losers at the end of the road. This is something that history has taught us well enough.

According to Bremmer the main reason for such diagnostic is that in today's world no nation would be capable, or even willing for that matter, to exercise individually a collective leadership such as some nations did in the past. This is the case of the US, a country that has not ceased to be a great power, indeed the main military power, and will probably continue to be so for a while. However, it is very likely that a heavily indebted Washington will have, for many years to come, an agenda dominated by local economic issues with the inevitable social consequences, many of them with clear implications in values and political behavior as has been evident in the recent paralysis of the US government. The same situation applies to Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other countries of the EU. Everything indicates that in the next years their energies will be focused on preventing the collapse of a construction that is showing evident signs of weakness. Additionally, it has become vulnerable to the effects of disturbing trends towards the radicalization of the domestic political front of some countries, which seem to be affected by an end of their illusions. The case of Greece illustrates this point. However, it might not be the only one and not even the most difficult to handle. At the same time, as indicated by Bremmer, it is also possible that the great re-emerging nations such as China and India will be focused for a long time on consolidating their modernization processes, which sometimes show signs of economic, social and political weakness. It is unlikely that in the short or even medium term these nations will have any interest in wasting energies in their trans-regional fronts if there is no pressing need for it. Unless, as has happened before in history, their leaderships eventually yield to the temptation of seeking external factors that help them preserve the necessary national cohesion.

Precisely, the notion of a polycentric and interconnected world is one of the main ideas of an in-depth report published by the EU Institute for Security Studies (de Vasconcelos 2012). This report analyzes in particular three main trends that are currently emerging and that would contribute to shape the global system towards 2030. These are: the empowerment of citizens, which contributes to the sense of belonging to a unique human community; a greater tension in relation to the objective of sustainable development; and the emergence of polycentrism characterized by shifts in power from the national states to individuals and different types of transnational networks and by growing governance gaps, in the measure that international institutions fail to answer appropriately to global public demands.

It is possible to imagine that the effectiveness and legitimacy of the decisions that result from an ambit such as the G20 would be enhanced if some of the nations that form part of it could speak in the name of their own regions. This seems not to be the case today, not even the EU in spite of the steps taken regarding its foreign policy with the enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon. It even has serious difficulties to preserve its capacity to devise collective answers to the economic and financial problems being faced by some of its members. In the case of South America, even if Argentina and Brazil are members of the G20, it would be difficult to consider that they always reflect the point of view of their region in such ambit.

2. Relevant factors that are emerging in new international realities.

We have entered then a period of transition towards a different world that will be characterized by a continuous dialectic tensions between the forces that drive towards convergence and, simultaneously, those that lead to fragmentation. It is still not possible to forecast which forces will prevail in each of the regions of the world. For a long time this will be a world full of uncertainties. It is necessary to keep in mind that those tensions will not exclude certain forms of violence, even innovative ones given the technological advances enacted by very different protagonists and not necessarily by states.

More connectivity and diversity, more difficulties to provide public goods that guarantee regional and global governance guidelines, more prominence of non-state actors -middle class citizens and urban consumers; social and production transnational networks- will be some of the other factors that will condition global economic competition in the future and, as a consequence, the international trade of goods and services.

Moreover, it will be a competition marked by the rising of a third industrial revolution (Marsh 2012). It will have an impact on new modalities of value chains of transnational scope. These could result from multiple impacts of all kinds of technological innovations in the development of novel forms of orchestration of productive chains that will seek to satisfy a growing demand for personalized products and services -combining resources, technologies, creativity and highly qualified labor- coming especially from the urban middle-class consumers.

Within the newly emerging international context the quality of the strategy for the insertion in the global economic competition of each nation and its firms will become increasingly important. This includes not only the right policies, instruments and roadmaps to navigate the world of the future, but also the density of connectivity with other nations and of the coalitions and alliances they build. The quality of the domestic front is a key variable if the aim is to stay on the winning side in the world of the future.

Some other relevant factors are surfacing in the new international reality. They could have a strong impact in the future development of global and regional international relations. We are referring to the issue of the empowerment of citizens and consumers and, more specifically, of the emerging urban middle classes. From the 8 billion people that will probably inhabit the world in 2030 about 4.9 billion will be middle class in terms of economic income. By 2030, 74% of China's consumers will be middle class and by 2040, 90% of Indian consumers will be middle class as well. Two-thirds of Brazilians will be considered to be middle class by 2030 (Neri 2012). Moreover, they will be middle class consumers and citizens that will live in cities and, in many cases, big cities of over one million inhabitants. They will be increasingly more educated, informed and interconnected, even at a global scale and well aware of the power that they hold. It is logical to imagine that they will attempt to use it. With their actions and demands they will sometimes surpass the deeds of governments. In some cases, they could become disoriented and "outraged" at the same time (Hessel 2011). This is why it can be considered that we are entering a stage of international relations in which, increasingly, the states could lose their role at least as the main actors. South America as a region is no stranger to these trends. According to UN data by 2030 the region will have about fifty cities with more than one million inhabitants and several cities with more than ten million citizens and consumers with expectations and consumption patterns characteristic of the middle class.

3. International trade negotiations and its impact in global governance.

If concluded successfully and this is not always the case, international trade negotiations among a group of nations that, due to their economic dimension, are relevant players in world trade, could have a strong impact on the design of a new global economic order and, obviously in the map of international trade. This is a reason why they need to be followed closely by nations and firms with active participation in world markets, even while not directly involved in a concrete negotiation. That is so because it is a known fact that the design of the rules of the global trade of tomorrow could have and influence in the future definition of winners and losers, with all the political implications this entails when nations compete for their presence in those markets that are the most attractive.

The above considerations become ever more relevant due to two concurrent facts: on the one hand, the stagnation that today dominates multilateral trade negotiations within the WTO and, on the other hand, the size of the economies involved in the current negotiations of preferential mega-trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or agreements that are being promoted at the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and by the EU itself, especially with India, Canada and Japan. Both facts evoke conflicting diagnoses. In some cases these focus on the need to preserve the WTO multilateral trading system. In others, they lead to propose a new organization with participation limited to a restricted group of nations (Baldwin 2012).

On the side of the WTO, until now there are no promising prospects with regards to the results expected from the next Bali Ministerial Conference, either in its three priority issues (trade facilitation, agriculture and issues related to developing and least developed countries) or in relation of a "post-Bali agenda". This issue is related to the credibility of the multilateral trading system and can be linked with the risks of a rising protectionism that could result from pessimistic perceptions about the evolution of the world economy.

On the side of the mega-trade agreements currently under negotiation, what is important to note is the fact that expanding the number of members (for example Japan and Korea) and the diversity of situations and interests at stake may nevertheless accentuate the doubts regarding they could be concluded soon. The other front where negotiation of a preferential mega-trade agreement is expected to conclude soon is that of the EU and India. However, difficulties persisted in some sectors that are precisely the most sensitive in the majority of the trade agreements currently under negotiation, especially those related with the automotive, the agriculture, intellectual property and government procurement chapters.

Understanding the evolution of the various fronts of international trade negotiations implies, moreover, to be able to interpret the major trends that are affecting the definition of the new map of global power and even of the different regions. Some authors has referred to the fact that these negotiations of preferential mega-trade agreements highlight the fact that power politics has come back to influence the strategies of the major players in world trade (Laïdi 2012). Even if this was always the case there has been a tendency to consider that economic factors were what really mattered, sometimes nuanced in certain analysis by the influence that the political factors could have on them. But it was only a nuance, given that the political was not viewed by many analysts as the central aspect.

If we attempt to diagnose the uncertain evolution of the current international scenario in the perspective of the future of global trade and the main fronts of multilateral and preferential trade negotiations, three factors seem relevant. The first is the diversity of actors. Today there are many nations with capacity to have a significant impact at the international level. Some of them -China and India- have centuries of accumulated experiences. Understanding the multiple options they have in their international strategies and, in particular, the cultural differences and perceptions of their interests and values is now something of increasing importance. A second factor is the strong dynamics of change. Being able to grasp in a timely manner those events loaded with future implications and the major trends the international arena is something necessary, difficult and relevant for each nation and their businesses. The third factor is complexity. It implies the need to understand the main differences and to resist tendencies to simplify reality. The least advisable in order to understand the world of today would be to pretend that what is happening, is something similar to what were realities when GATT or even the WTO were created.

4. Three conditions required for the construction of global and regional governance: the cases of Mercosur and of the EU-Mercosur negotiations.

Three conditions are required in order to move forward in the concerted construction of reasonable governance, both the global and regional levels. These would apply also if the aim is to build inter-regional spaces such as the ones that could result from the Mercosur-EU negotiations, in the measure that they effectively aspires to become something more than just an attempt at improving trade and investments (Peña 2013). These conditions are a firm political will aimed at achieving ambitious goals at the global or regional level; a strategic idea that is feasible and adapted to the interests of all the participating nations, and technical creativity in the definition of the methods to be used for its attainment.

As for the political will, it is a crucial condition in the measure that it originates at the highest political level of each of the protagonists but, as the case of Mercosur demonstrates, it would seem not to suffice if it were limited to just a foundational moment. On the contrary, to be effective it should become sustainable in time as a political drive that flows steadily into the negotiating table where the actual common decisions are made.

Concerning the second condition, a strategic idea driving the political thrust should be feasible. This implies that it needs to be based on concrete interests of the different nations, on the reality of their relative power and, most particularly, on a correct assessment of the international context where the initiative is inserted, including its continuous adaptation to the changes that are taking place, sometimes at a very fast pace. For a long time, this was accomplished in European on the basis of a vision molded by the idea inspired by Monnet and nurtured by the political will of Schumann and Adenauer, among others. It doesn´t appear to be the case in the more recent years.

And the third condition is a good dose of technical creativity. This implies not to follow previous models or text-book recommendations. On the contrary, it is about the creation of mechanisms and instruments adapted to the objectives and to the reality of the protagonists, and to the conditions that might result from global and regional commitments previously assumed by them. Both in the case of the future construction of Mercosur as of the Mercosur-EU bi-regional partnership, said creativity should additionally take advantage of flexibilities that result from the ambiguous rules of WTO and of GATT's article XXIV-8.

At the South America geographic space, if fulfilled and combined together, the three abovementioned conditions would imply a most necessary qualitative leap both in Mercosur's and UNASUR experiences, and in the future development of a bi-regional partnership with the EU that could be extended then to similar preferential trade agreements with other nations and regions. If this were the case, those processes would contribute towards the construction of global and inter-regional governance. But in both cases it seems necessary that they could retrieve its symbolic power as a political and strategic project. However, even more fundamental still will be that the citizens of the member countries can see a clear link between their legitimate expectations for democracy, employment and social progress and the commitments assumed and in their effective implementation. This is not happening yet today and could be the origin of the evident signs of dissatisfaction that can be seen regarding their results and their future perspectives.

5. Is possible an optimistic view about the increasing value of South America?

Latin America is a region of increasing value in the perspective of relevant players of world economic competition. It becomes more evident in the case of re-emerging economies such as China and India. It is reflected by trade flows and direct investments. This fact does not go unnoticed by the US or the countries of the EU.

Such valuation is even more notorious in the case of South America. Is possible to sustain, as Marco Aurelio Garcia did, that is becoming "the world's most relevant region in terms of food production…additionally we have enormous mineral reserves of the conventional type, such as iron, and of the new generation kind, such as lithium. We also have both due to the size of the population and the social inclusion policies being implemented in our countries…the reality of a considerable internal market. We are almost 400 million South Americans and have become a main point of attraction. We have abundant water resources and biodiversity". He completed his idea pointing out that: "additionally, we possess characteristics that are essential to guarantee the quality of life. It is a region with certain cultural and linguistic homogeneity, which prevents us from being overburdened by the task of having to deal with several languages or a diversity of cultures. Moreover, it is a peaceful region. It is probably the only region in the world where there are no nuclear weapons….and if any conflict regarding border issues should arise, they can be easily resolved through diplomatic means. Moreover…it is a region of democratic governments, voted in free elections and under international scrutiny" (Garcia 2011 - the translation is ours).
A view such as this expresses some convincing arguments that allow having an optimistic view on the role of the region in the global economic competition of the future. These may explain the fact that in many cases, governments, businessmen and citizens are becoming increasingly assertive, pragmatic and optimistic.

Of course, the huge challenges that the countries of the region will need to overcome in the next years should not be overlooked. It is a known fact that in a world of constant systemic change any optimistic view could prove risky. In the case of South America, given the image that has long prevailed in more developed countries, especially in Europe and in the US, it has often been safer to predict negative scenarios. Today, however, there are some factors that lead to propose a more positive forecast with regards to the value of the region. To begin with the shortcomings that may still be observed, it would be relevant to refer to the inventory of reasons that have for long fueled the skepticism on the region. The following are some factors that could eventually justify a continued pessimistic view regarding its future: the subsistence of poverty in large social sectors and, in particular, of great social inequalities; the low institutional quality reflected by a weak ability to ensure the articulation of contradicting social interests and the predominance of the rule of law in social life; the political instability as an endemic condition often leading to schemes that are not sustainable for efficiently dealing with the most serious economic and social problems; the insufficient number of firms with the capacity to compete in international markets, which is the result of a low level of innovation and investment in science and technology. These factors, among others, have had prevalence in the analysis of the future of the region, leading to pessimistic conclusions even when they are assessed together with other factors of a more positive nature, such as the abundance of valuable natural resources.

Before mentioning the circumstances that would lead to a more optimistic view, we should remember that these not always surface with similar characteristics and the same intensity in every country of the region. South America is a vast and diversified territory. There can be no analysis of the realities and perceptions without acknowledging the differences, at times very deep, that exist between the countries. Therefore the factors that would account for a more optimistic forecast of the future of the region are not necessarily valid for every one of them. However, they are more visible today in certain countries that have become key ones due to their size and economic relevance, and that have thus a strong potential to generate a spillover effect of their eventual success to the rest of the region.

Even when other cases could be mentioned, one of these countries is Brazil. The deep changes that took place in the recent two decades are transforming the largest country of South America in what may be a driving force of a more positive future for the rest of the region. Certainly, this does not imply that Brazil by itself can lead the rest of the region to different levels of economic and political development. On the contrary, the construction of a regional space functional to a scenario of peace, political stability and sustainable social and economic development will require an active cooperation between several nations, and even of those outside the region but with strong interests in it.

Having made this point clear, it is then possible to mention at least three reasons that would allow having a cautiously optimistic view of the future of South America.

The first of these reasons refers to those aspects in which the learning process of the last decades becomes more evident. Firstly, the growing number of social and political leaders representing a wide ideological spectrum, and of vast sectors of the public opinion in different nations who recognize the importance of fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability to guarantee development goals within a democratic and open society framework. The second one refers to the recognition of the importance of institutional quality to move forward in the areas of productive transformation, social cohesion and competitive insertion in world economy. Thirdly, the clear perception that in the current international system nobody will take up the problems of another nation -unless these affect them directly or indirectly- and that the destiny of any country -big or small- will need to be worked out at a national level with an active participation of all the society. The need to reach the articulation of the different social interests and to achieve collective disciplines as a result of strong institutions; a home-grown strategy for economic development; and a competitive insertion in world economy are three lessons that several countries of the region and their public opinions are drawing from their experiences of the last decades. These have a strong impact on social attitudes and public policies.

A second reason to be optimistic is the existence of clear signs of a cultural change with regards to what the region may achieve in the future. These signs are related with the great value being assigned to the definition of long term objectives and to the development of pragmatic strategies to achieve them. This entails having a clear idea of where a country is headed to in terms of its development and its international insertion, what it can effectively achieve and, most particularly, which steps would be necessary to move forward along the chosen path. It is possibly in this aspect where the greatest differences between the countries of the region can be found. Deeply rooted structural issues, yet unresolved, including those related with the active participation of all social actors in the development of the nation, can sometimes explain these differences. In some cases the countries are still on their way towards achieving greater social inclusion. These can account for a certain propensity towards political instability and even towards economic and social policies of a more radical nature. In such cases future perspectives are more questionable and uncertain.

The third reason is related with the impact of deep changes that are taking place in the global scenario. As a result the countries of the region now have multiple options in terms of external markets and sources of investment and technology. As a consequence diversification in their international relations has expanded. They perceive that they have a significant value for what might be their contribution to face some of the critical problems of the global agenda. Energy, food security and climate change are some of the issues about which the countries of the region, especially acting together, have something to say.

Finally, if the most optimistic forecasts regarding the region were to be confirmed in the next years, taking full advantage of this would require moving forward in a dynamic articulation of the national interests of its countries. This could only be feasible through collective leadership. On this regard, the strategic alliance of Argentina with Brazil and Mercosur itself constitute the hard-core of the construction of a South American geographic space, in which UNASUR will be called upon to play also an essential role.

Recommended Reading:

  • Acharya, Amitav, in Henry, Ken; Shuli, Hu; Feigenbaum, Evan A.; Acharya, Amitav, "Multiplex world: steps toward a new global order", East Asia Forum, ANU, Canberra, August 14, 2013, at
  • Aron, Raymond, "Paix et Guerre entre les nations", Calmann-Lévy, Paris 1962.
  • Baldwin, Richard, Baldwin, Richard, "WTO 2.0: Global governance of supply-chain trade", Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Policy Insight N° 64, London, December 2012, at
  • Bremmer, Ian, "Every Nation for Itself. Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World", Portfolio/Penguin, New York 2012.
  • De Vasconcelos, Alvaro (ed), "Global Trends 2030 - Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World", European Union Institute for Security Studies - ESPAS Report, April 27, 2012, at
  • Garcia, Marco Aurelio, Press Interview, "Última Hora", Asunción, 28 March 2011, at:
  • Goldstein, Joshua S., "Long Cycles. Prosperity and War in the Modern Age", Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1988.
  • Hessel, Stéphane, "Indignez Vous!, Éditions Indigène, Paris 2011.
  • Laïdi, Zaki, "Trade deals show power politics is back", "Financial Times", 31 mars 2013, at:
  • Marsh, Peter, "The New Industrial Revolution. Consumers, Globalization and the End of Mass Production", Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2012.
  • Morin, Edgar, "Le éloge de la métamorphose", "Le Monde", 10-01-2010, at:
  • Neri, Marcelo, "A Nova Classe Média. O lado brilhante da base da pirámide", Editora Saraiva, São Paulo 2011.
  • Peña, Félix, "Much more than trade and investments: is the future Mercosur-European Union bi-regional agreement a contribution toward effective global governance?", APEX Electronic Book "Mercosur-European Union Dialogue", 2013, at:
  • Zakaria, Faree, "The Post-American World", W.W.Norton & Company, New York 2088.

Félix Peña Director of the Institute of International Trade at the ICBC Foundation. Director of the Masters Degree in International Trade Relations at Tres de Febrero National University (UNTREF). Member of the Executive Committee of the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI). Member of the Evian Group Brains Trust. More information. |

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