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  Miami-Florida European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair, 2014 | 2014
A Preliminary View of the Negotiation of the TTIP: a Step Toward the Fragmentation of the International Trading System?


The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States.

Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez (editors)

Preface by Antonio de Lecea

With the special editorial assistance of Dina Moulioukova

Miami-Florida European Union Center Jean Monnet Chair, 2014

Co-edition by Argentine Council of Foreign Relations (CARI). Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Download here.


It is too soon yet to make any serious appraisal of the impact that an eventual Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)-as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP)-could have on the multilateral global trading system and in those countries that are full members of Mercosur, or that share the idea of a South American integration process. To a great extent, the impact will depend on the situation of both the WTO and Mercosur at the moment that the actual negotiations are concluded. Also, it will depend on the results of the bi-regional EU-Mercosur negotiations. What is clear is that, if concluded and effectively implemented, both the TTIP and the TPP could eventually have a strong impact-even a negative one-on the global multilateral trading system and that this impact should be carefully appraised by Mercosur and other South American countries. The impact will particularly depend on some of the chapters of the agreements that could be concluded and especially of the commitments related, among others, with agriculture and intellectual property. But for the time being it is possible to sustain that the perception of a positive conclusion of both negotiations will, without doubt, stimulate the current debate about the future of Mercosur and of South American integration.

The multilateral trading system in the transition to a new global economic order

There seems to be a certain consensus about the gradual erosion of the global multilateral trading system institutionalized by the WTO that could be the result, on the one hand, of the cumulative effects of the standstill of the Doha Round (Evenett & Jara 2013) and, on the other hand, of new initiatives that would lead to accentuate the proliferation of interregional mega- preferential trade agreements such as the TPP and the TTIP.

Due to the eventual fragmentation effects on the institutional framework of world trade, said erosion may not only affect the transnational flows of goods, services and productive investments but may have geopolitical connotations as well. The debate surrounding the geopolitical dimension of the TPP is proof of this (Lim, Elms & Low 2012). If this were the case, it could also affect the already compromised global governance in terms of the prevalence of conditions for peace and stability in the world and in the different regions. Global governance was, we must recall, one of the main driving forces that accounted for the origin of the multilateral global trading system through the creation of GATT and then of WTO (Van Grasstek 2013).

This is the reason why the adaptation of the global multilateral trading system to the profound transformations that are currently taking place in world power and in global economic competition is regarded as one of the main challenges for the international agenda of the upcoming years. This adaptation could be even more necessary if we consider the perception that many countries have-especially the emerging and re-emerging protagonists-that, in great measure, the existing institutions and rules reflect a reality of world power that is being rapidly overcome (Peña 2013c). Unlike the world in which the global multilateral trading system was born, where few countries had the sufficient power to adopt decisions and generate rules that penetrated reality, the present one is much more diverse, complex and dynamic. It is a world of many protagonists and clubs. However, there is not a dominant club such as the 'oligarchic condominium' referred to by some analysts in the sixties and seventies during last century.

It seems difficult to imagine that in the short or even in the medium term it will be feasible to agree on re-founding schemes that entail an in-depth revision of the WTO system, assuming that this were eventually advisable. The difficulty of bringing together the sufficient critical mass of world power that is needed to revise or to create new institutions and relevant rules would indicate that the initiated transition will require some time before we can enter a new stage of the global multilateral trading system. Therefore, the idea of metamorphosis would seem more advisable. It would imply opening a debate on the revision of some of the mechanisms and instruments of the current multilateral trading system that, if introduced, could help improve its effectiveness, efficiency and social legitimacy. At the very least, this could help stop the current trend of gradual deterioration of these three systemic qualities that are essential for the relevance of those institutions and rules.

Among the relevant issues that have an impact on the systemic deterioration that was mentioned above, there are two that deserve attention. First is the issue of how WTO members can address trade emergency measures through safety valves that imply greater flexibility than what is tolerated by the present rules. Second, how to strengthen collective disciplines on preferential trade agreements to prevent them from contributing to a greater fragmentation of the world trading system and even to its fracture.

Given the potential of preferential trade agreements to fragment the global multilateral trading system, especially those that involve several countries from different regions, or that include commitments that transcend those made within the WTO, it would seem advisable to analyze new collective disciplines. These should ensure effective transparency regarding any preferential measures-that could be discriminatory for those countries that are not members of a particular agreement-and a periodic independent technical assessment of their effects on trade and investment flows originating in third countries and on the cohesiveness of the global multilateral trading system.

Trends towards the fragmentation of the global multilateral trading system

A common ground today is that all member countries agree that the global multilateral trading system must be preserved and strengthened. But at the same time all signs indicate that it will take time to articulate the required consensus, either to conclude the current multilateral negotiations, to suspend them for good-nobody seems to be interested in having the responsibility of accounting for a failure in the inevitable blame game that would follow-, or to agree new negotiation modalities that allow to soften the rigidity of the single undertaking such as, for example, those that do not require the participation of all member countries and that are agreed within the WTO framework (different variations of plurilateral agreements). There are certain factors that show an influence on this regard.

The first factor is the high number of participating countries, with evident differences in relative power, cultural traditions and degree of economic development. After the addition of Russia and other countries the number of WTO members has currently grown to 159. It is quite a difficult task to find an agreement among all of them regarding agendas that are filled with the most diverse and sensitive issues, both for political and economic reasons. The most relevant fact is that the scattering of relative power among the relevant players in world trade has increased since the creation of the WTO.

A second factor that anticipates a period of uncertainties in the WTO is the low intensity of the present incentives to conclude the Doha Round. This may be explained by the effects of the current international financial and economic turbulence, which have accentuated political reflexes against innovation in all the non-urgent issues. Concretely, if the domestic political costs are high the tendency of the protagonists is to favor inertia, even when this could mean risking eventual long term benefits.

A third factor is a growing trend towards favoring alternative paths to those offered by the global multilateral trading system. The difficulties to move forward in the successful conclusion of the Doha Round feed this trend. It is then understandable that the alternatives proposed by different types of restricted preferential mega-clubs might prove more functional to the aim of facilitating the expansion of trade and investment flows among the participating nations. Additionally, these allow for the creation of WTO plus agreements. Said clubs are not limited to countries from neighboring geographic spaces, where preferential agreements are regarded as instruments of the strategies for regional governance and may have deep economic integration purposes.

With the prospect of a weakening of the WTO multilateral framework the proliferation of preferential agreements between large markets could contribute to a fragmentation, even a chaotic one, of the world trading system. However, the main problem could derive from the fact that the relevant players of the world political scenario eventually perceive that some of these agreements pursue geopolitical objectives that go far beyond trade and investment flows. This could imply the beginning of a dangerous game that may contribute to a greater fragmentation of the international political system. The epicenter of such game could result from the competition between great powers, both longstanding and re-emerging, in geopolitical spaces with a high potential for conflict. On this regard, the perception that countries such as China, the US and the EU (still trying to manage its own identity crisis) may have of the intentions of each one of them at the time of promoting preferential and WTO plus mega-agreements should be watched closely.

Even after the Ninth Ministerial Conference of last December in Bali, the WTO and especially the Doha Round still raise questions regarding their future (Peña 2013e). However, certain positive events should be highlighted, such as the acknowledgement that the Doha Round is at an impasse that generates the need to explore different negotiation approaches that are compatible with the principles of inclusion and transparency.

At the multilateral level, the non-discrimination principle expressed by the most-favored-nation treatment of article I of the GATT is one of the key elements of the trading system. Together with the consolidation of what each country grants to all other countries, it provides the system, at least in the regulatory aspect, with the expectation of a relative potential for stability and a relevant insurance against discrimination and protectionism. With the evolution experienced after the Uruguay Round by the mechanism of dispute settlement within the WTO, the global multilateral trading system has reinforced its tendency to be rule-oriented increasing thus its political and economic value and its standing as an international public asset.

The other level is that of the different preferential trade spaces. These result either from regional governance strategies, as are the cases of the EU and Mercosur among other relevant examples, or from strategies for the international projection of the trade interests of nations or groups of nations, such as the multiple existing preferential trade agreements that are supposed to be consistent with the GATT and GATS principles and rules.

The proliferation of such agreements of partial scope, in the sense that they do not encompass all WTO members, has intensified during the last years. It has given rise to the creation of different types of preferential agreements. As mentioned previously, some are what can be called regional agreements in the strictest sense, with a clear goal of contributing to the governance of the corresponding regional geographic space. Others, instead, have materialized between distant countries. Two common traits can be noticed in all of them: they answer to explicit or implicit political objectives and they are discriminatory in relation to the main principle of the most-favored-nation treatment institutionalized by the GATT-WTO. Increasingly, they also include non-preferential trade elements that do not imply exceptions to the abovementioned principle of non-discrimination. This proliferation of preferential agreements may even increase if the Doha Round is not completed or if no reforms to the multilateral global trading system are introduced.

Issues related with the dialectic tension between the global multilateral and the preferential levels are currently relevant for the world trade system and, in particular, for the GATT-WTO. The idea of the predominance of one level-for example, the global-over the others may correspond with theoretical and ideological views. In reality this is not the case and it is unlikely for it to happen unless there is an effective centralization of world power, something that seems highly improbable, at least from what can be anticipated from the current international situation.

What is customary presented as a dichotomy between global multilateralism and preferential regionalism is a relation viewed as complementary by some analysts and as antagonist by others. In this regard, it is important to identify the factors that can have the strongest impact, either positive or negative, on the predominance of complementarily or antagonism in order to achieve a reasonable balance between them.

Time is one of the main factors that could explain the trend to develop preferential trade agreements, particularly when these are unrelated to governance strategies of regional geographic spaces. In this sense, it has been observed in the case of the Doha Round that the main costs at the global multilateral level, especially the local political ones, are incurred in the short term, whereas the benefits only begin to show in the mid and long term. This fact has caused a growing number of countries -and its businesses- to attempt to move forward through agreements of partial scope, thus conforming at times preferential trading networks in connection with a particular country.

But it is necessary to remember that, for most analysts, international trade regimes are just one of the components that determine the dynamics of world trade. Others are the transition from the industrial to the knowledge society; technological developments in the areas of transportation, communication and logistics; the intensification of the globalization of financial markets, and the proliferation and strengthening of transnational productive chains.

Relevance of regional governance for stability at the global level

The attention of protagonists and analysts is increasingly focusing on the impact of the global crisis on their corresponding regional geographic areas. History reminds us that the scenarios for political collapse and even for its most negative consequences in terms of armed confrontations have, in general, started out as regional conflicts (MacMillan 2013).

Attention to the adjacent contexts is especially relevant in those integration processes aiming to ensure reasonable governance conditions, such as peace and stability, for the respective region. They also offer the potential for strengthening the ability of each of the member countries to achieve their own goals in terms of productive transformation and insertion in the global economy. This is the case of the EU, ASEAN and Mercosur. These processes usually have a political origin which, if the fundamental motivations are preserved or renewed, may account for the long- term vitality of their economic content.

It is well known that regional integration processes are constantly submitted to the dialectic tension between factors that drive towards fragmentation and those required as conditions for greater cooperation and integration, at least among the respective economic systems. It is also a known fact that there is not a unique model to preserve and strengthen the political will of sovereign states to work together. This means that each regional geographic space needs to develop its own methods to articulate national interests. This task is often a complex one when trying to reconcile the sometimes very deep differences in relative power, economic dimensions and level of development among participating countries. As a result of the current global crisis, such methods of regional integration are now being tested in at least three fronts. The first is the protectionist trend in the mutual relations of participating countries, the second relates to the ability to articulate common positions in response to the effects of the crisis and the third is the exercise of an effective collective leadership in the corresponding regional space.
Ultimately, the issue of an effective collective leadership within Mercosur or South America is reflected in the foreign perception of the role of Brazil (Peña 2013d). Due to its economic dimensions and its increasing institutional strength, Brazil is perceived as a country able to assume the leadership of the South American region as well as of Mercosur. This was previously shown in the strategic partnership that was agreed between Brazil and the EU. However the experiences of other regional geographic spaces indicate that efficient leaderships are those that result in the creation of shared positions among different countries that are perceived as having the capacity, at the same time, to be relevant protagonists and leaders themselves.

Looking into the future the challenge for Mercosur countries and for the South American region is still to achieve what other regions, in particular Europe, have already accomplished: to provide an institutional framework for collective leaderships based on mechanisms that may prove relatively efficient to build consensus and coordinate positions in times such as the current global economic crisis.

Toward an era of interregional mega-preferential trade agreements?

After the experience with the failure of the hemispheric FTAA negotiations, it seems premature to venture a prediction on the possibility that the negotiations of the TPP (Lim, Elms & Low 2012) and the TTIP (Madariaga 2013; Seshadri 2013) are concluded in a reasonable period of time. But given the fact that it is difficult to imagine that the Doha Round will be concluded anytime soon, it would seem advisable to work under the assumption that we are entering an era of interregional mega-preferential trade agreements with strong geopolitical connotations. This could be a period with multilateral disciplines and large 'private clubs' of a discriminatory trade nature towards the non-participating countries, not so much by means of tariffs but through other measures affecting trade flows and investments, especially those resulting from the various regulatory frameworks.

A vision of the future of the negotiations between Mercosur countries and the EU with the aim of concluding a bi-regional association agreement should be placed with such framework (Kegel & Amal 2012; Messerlin 2013; Peña 2013a). Years have passed since the idea of this interregional preferential agreement was launched. Dreams were diluted. Negotiations lost their dynamism. At times they stagnated. And one of the factors that gave initial momentum disappeared after the explicit wreck of the FTAA at the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata (2005). At the same time, the fact that the Doha Round also entered a state of starvation contributed to cool down the negotiating mood on both sides of the Atlantic. We should keep in mind that the WTO negotiations were perceived as the ambit that would eventually help untie one of the most complex knots in the bi-regional Mercosur-EU relations which is agriculture, especially for the distorting effects that are rightly attributed to the Community's agricultural policy. In turn, in European eyes, Mercosur has been losing credibility and, therefore, its appeal. Today, the changes in the global economic environment find both protagonists of this relationship going through their own identity crises (Van Middelaar 2013).

In Santiago de Chile, in January 2013, Mercosur and the EU reaffirmed once again their political will to conclude a bi-regional association. They had done this before on occasion of the Madrid Summit in 2010. They have been negotiating for thirteen years now. Finally they agreed that in the last quarter of last year 'at the latest' they would make the delayed exchange of offers. They still seem to maintain the idea that such offers should lead to the release of substantially all the trade, conceived from a dogmatic interpretation but without a solid legal foundation in GATT-WTO rules and according to which coverage of at least 90% of the bi-regional trade should be ensured. At the beginning of 2014 (January) the exchange of offers is still a commitment, not a fact. And the blame game is actively promoted in both sides of the Atlantic.

The signs of life manifested in Santiago do not exclude the strong questioning posed by the future of these negotiations. At times they lead to options that are reflected in proposals aimed at materializing some form of agreement of bi-lateral scope, for example, between the E.U. and individual Mercosur countries. It has even been suggested that it could be within the framework of a multi speed bi-regional agreement.

However the above scenario also has sensitive political rough edges. It could weaken to a dangerous extent the distinction between 'us and them' that since the Alfonsin-Sarney agreements in 1985-86 has been a key feature of the strategic relation between Argentina and Brazil, with all the unfoldings that it has had since its origins and that still has today. These certainly transcend the bilateral political and economic level. They contribute to something that is of great value for each of the two countries and that can be called the 'quality of the neighborhood' in terms of peace, democracy, political stability and social and economic development of all South America. Most notably, this includes the existing bilateral agreements in the nuclear field that are undoubtedly an example of understanding between neighboring nations in a more than sensitive issue which transcends the regional scope.

The foreign trade agenda of Mercosur: some requirements posed by future international negotiations.

As with individuals, firms or institutions, a group of countries that are linked together in an integration process, especially if it includes a common external tariff as a central element of its collective disciplines, must have an agenda of external trade relations. Or at least this would be convenient. This agenda usually defines priorities, fronts of action, steps to be taken and, when possible, a timetable. Nowadays it should even be possible for such agenda to be consulted by citizens online. Of course, this is not always the case. If it is an association of countries such as Mercosur, the external agenda defines the roadmap for its possible, necessary or desired trade insertion in the world and its region. This implies sending signals to other countries, especially to those with which it aspires to negotiate, regarding its preferences and priorities. It is meant, above all, to provide a guide for local and foreign investors of the future that it envisions for the trade of its goods and services and for productive investments that create jobs and prosperity. It is an element of predictability. This also is evident when we see that many current and potential partners or competitors of Mercosur and its member countries tend to rethink their own agendas of external trade negotiations, especially as a result of international changes taking place at the following three closely interrelated levels.

As we mentioned earlier, the first of these three levels is the global multilateral trading system. On this regard, the standstill of the Doha Round is a clear evidence of the difficulties in relation to one of the WTO main roles which is precisely to facilitate trade negotiations comprising all member countries.

The second level is that of the negotiations of mega preferential trade agreements, including those of interregional scope such as the abovementioned TTIP and TPP as well as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECEP). Due to their size and commercial importance we should also include those being developed by the EU with India and Mercosur, assuming that in both cases the current uncertainties are eventually overcome. These are trade negotiations which on the whole will mean that a substantial part of the world's population, gross product and trade will be covered under preferential rules.

It is still difficult to predict if these negotiations will culminate in agreements signed and ratified by the participating countries. The precedent of the failed FTAA negotiations proves that, beyond the expectations that may be generated, even resorting to a good dose of 'media diplomacy' with all kinds of 'special effects' they will not always conclude in the signing of an agreement. And the precedent of the Havana Charter of 1948, which originated the International Trade Organization (ITO), is also a reminder that even when negotiations conclude successfully they may later fail to pass the test of parliamentary approval and thus of ratification and entry into force. The fact that, at least by the end of January 2014, it was yet difficult to predict when the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) would be approved by the US Congress (if that effectively occurs within a reasonable period of time) contributes to the doubts about the future evolution of the TPP and TTIP interregional negotiations.

But if the corresponding agreements were finally concluded and took effect, they could produce two types of results that could even be sequential. One result would be the emptying of the global multilateral trading system, with the possible consequences that this could have in terms of the erosion of the WTO as a relevant institution for global governance. In this case, the impact would transcend the more limited level of world trade. The other possible result would be that these agreements generate commitment standards in terms of the regulation of the global trade of goods and services as well as, among others, investments, intellectual property and government procurement, which could later be extended to the multilateral level. In practice, it could imply excluding those countries not participating in such agreements from the process of defining rules and institutions which in the future could govern world trade. And it is hard to imagine that the excluded countries, especially if they have or aspire to have a relevant participation in global trade and in world power, will passively accept such marginalization.

And the third level is that of the multiple forms of transnational production chains of global, regional or inter-regional scope (Baumann 2013; Ferrando 2013; Valls Pereira 2013; Altenberg 2013; Gunnarsson Ljungkvist 2013; Jenks & Persson 2013). In the glossary of current commercial diplomacy they are encompassed under the concept of global value chains. Sometimes they are the result of the fragmentation of the production processes of large transnational corporations in different countries, with the ensuing impact on investment flows, distribution services, transportation and logistics. But they are also the result of the cross-border linkages of groups of enterprises-often small and medium sized-with specialization niches and strong complementation potential.

Recent developments in these three levels have had repercussions in Latin America and particularly in the South American regional space. An example of this is the debate installed in Mercosur countries on how to address the new realities of trade and international trade negotiations. The fact that the idea of Mercosur as a joint strategic project of a group of South American countries has not been questioned yet becomes much more relevant when we note the frequency with which different analysts and protagonists suggest that countries such as Brazil should rethink their relation in view of other approaches considered more appropriate. In particular, the model which is in contrast with that of Mercosur is that of the Pacific Alliance (Peña 2013b). In doing so, it is assumed that the partnership has already produced the results announced by its four member countries. But still it is difficult to determine the real practical extent of the progress that would be taking place in its development.


In the near future the evolution of Mercosur and of the integration ideas in Latin America and in the South American regional space will be strongly influenced by the developments both at the multilateral level of the WTO and at the interregional preferential level, particularly as a result, among others, of the actual negotiations of TTIP and TPP. Both levels are at this moment characterized by several uncertainties originated in a highly dynamic and complex international environment and, particularly, in the deep changes in the distribution of political and economic power among the main protagonists of global economic competition. It is possible to anticipate that these uncertainties will prevail for some years still.

What is clear is that, if concluded and effectively implemented, both the TTIP and the TPP could eventually have a strong impact-even a negative one-on the global multilateral trading system and that this impact should be carefully evaluated by Mercosur and other South American countries. The scope of the impact will depend, in particular, of some of the chapters of the agreements that could be concluded and especially of the commitments related, among others, with agriculture and intellectual property. But for the moment it is possible to sustain that the perception of a positive conclusion of both negotiations will, without doubt, stimulate the current debate about the future of Mercosur and of South American integration.

Recommended Reading:

  • Altenberg, Per. 2013. "Global Value Chains and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership", Kommerskollegium National Board of Trade, May, accessed at:
  • Baumann, Renato. 2013. "Cadeias globais de valor e complementaridade productiva na América do Sul", Pontes, 9 (10), accessed at:
  • Evennet, Simon and Jara, Alejandro (edts.). 2013. Building on Bali: A Work Programme for the WTO. London: Vox-Eu org. e-Book, accessed at:
  • Ferrando, Alonso. 2013. "Las Cadenas Globales de Valor, los Países en Desarrollo y sus PYMES", Instituto de Estrategia Internacional, November, accessed at:
  • Gunnarsson Ljungkvist, Malin. 2013. "Global Value Chains and Developing Countries: An Introduction", Kommerskollegium National Board of Trade, November, accessed at:
  • Jenks, Andrew and Persson, Sofía. 2013. "Global Value Chains and Services: An Introduction", Kommerskollegium National Board of Trade, February, accessed at:
  • Kegel, Patricia Luiza and Amal, Mohamed. 2012. "Mercosur and its Current Relationship to the European Union. Prospects and Challenges in a Changing World", ZEI, Discussion Paper, C209, accessed at:
  • Lehmann, Jean Pierre 2013. "Bali Boost: WTO Lives, Snatched for Now from Jaws of Defeat", YaleGlobal Online, accessed at:
  • Lim, C.L.; Elms, Deborah K. and Low, Patrick . 2012. The Trans-Pacific Partnership. A Quest for Twenty-first-Century Trade Agreement. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • MacMillan, Margaret. 2013. The War that Ended Peace. The Road to 1914, New York: Random House.
  • Madariaga Foundation. 2013. Transatlantic FTA: Boosting Growth at what Cost?. Brussels: Madariaga Foundation.
  • Messerlin, Patrick. 2013. "O acordo do libre comercio Mercosul-UE: uma perspectiva europeia", Pontes, 9 (10), accessed at:
  • Peña, Félix. 2013. "Much more than trade and investments: is the future Mercosur-European Union bi-regional agreement a contribution toward effective global governance", APEX-Brazil - Mercosur European Union Dialogue, January, accessed at:
  • Peña, Félix, 2013. "Mercosur and the Alliance of the Pacific: Their Role in Latin American Regional Integration ¿Are they opposed or can be complementary?". Monthly Newsletter, June, accessed at:
  • Peña, Félix. 2013. "Future global and regional governance: a view from the Deep South, Paper prepared for the Seminar "Global Governance: Crossed Perceptions", FUNAG and University of Bologna, accessed at:
  • Peña, Félix. 2013. "Reflections and Recommended Courses of Action: Trade relations between Argentina and Brazil in the framework of Mercosur". Monthly Newsletter, November, accessed at:
  • Peña, Félix. 2013. "Credibility, Collective Leadership and Future Horizon: Three gains as a result from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali". Monthly Newsletter, accessed at:
  • Primo Braga, Carlos. 2013. "The WTO Bali Package. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is (still) alive", IMD Challenges, accessed at:
  • Seshadri, V.S. 2013. "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership". Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS). RIS-Discussion Papers, 185, accessed at:
  • Valls Pereira, Lia. 2013. "A nova onda de regionalismo e as cadeias globais de valor: reflexões sobre o Brasil". Pontes, 9 (11), accessed at:
  • Van Grasstek, Craig. 2013. "The History and Future of the World Trade Organization", Geneva: WTO, accessed at:
  • Van Middelaar, Luuk. 2013.The Passage to Europe. How a Continent Became a Union, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Félix Peña Director of the Institute of International Trade at the ICBC Foundation. Director of the Masters Degree in International Trade Relations at Tres de Febrero National University (UNTREF). Member of the Executive Committee of the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI). Member of the Evian Group Brains Trust. More information. |

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